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  Do	  Market	  Incentives	  Crowd	  Out	  Charitable	  Giving?	  
	  





Donations	   and	   volunteerism	   can	   be	   conceived	   of	   as	  market	   transactions	  with	   a	   zero	   explicit	  
price.	  	  However,	   evidence	   suggests	   people	   may	   not	   view	   zero	   as	   just	   another	   price	   when	   it	  
comes	  to	  pro-­‐social	  behavior.	  Thus,	  while	  markets	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  increase	  the	  supply	  of	  
assets	  available	  to	  those	  in	  need,	  some	  worry	  such	  financial	  incentives	  will	  crowd	  out	  altruistic	  
giving.	   This	   paper	   reports	   laboratory	   experiments	   directly	   investigating	   the	   degree	   to	   which	  
market	   incentives	   crowd	   out	   large,	   discrete	   charitable	   donations	   in	   a	   setting	   related	   to	  
deceased	  organ	  donation.	  The	  results	  suggest	  markets	  increase	  the	  supply	  of	  assets	  available	  to	  
those	   in	   need.	  	  However,	   as	   some	   critics	   fear,	  market	   incentives	   disproportionately	   influence	  
the	  relatively	  poor.	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Demand	   for	   organs	   has	   outpaced	   donor	   supply	   to	   the	   point	   that	  more	   than	   100,000	  
people	   in	   the	  United	  States	   in	  need	  of	  an	  organ	  transplant	  are	  currently	  on	  a	  waiting	   list.1	   In	  
fact,	  over	  6000	  Americans	  die	  each	  year	  while	  on	  the	  waiting	  list	  for	  organ	  transplants.2	  	  Around	  
the	  world,	  societies	  are	  grappling	  with	  ways	  to	  reduce	  the	  shortage	  of	   transplantable	  organs.	  
Some	   countries	   have	   introduced	   “presumed	   consent”	   or	   opt-­‐out	   policies	   for	   cadaveric	   organ	  
donation	  (see	  Abadie	  and	  Gay,	  2006	  and	  Mossialos	  et	  al,	  2008),	  and	  others	  have	  begun	  offering	  
waiting	   list	   priority	   to	   registered	   donors	   (see	   Kessler	   and	   Roth	   2012).	   	   Another	   possible	  
approach	   to	   solving	   the	   organ	   shortage	   is	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   market	   for	   body	   parts.	   Since	   a	  
donation	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  market	  transaction	  with	  a	  price	  of	  zero,	  proponents	  have	  argued	  
that	  providing	  monetary	  incentives	  to	  increase	  the	  supply	  of	  transplant	  organs	  would	  alleviate	  
shortages	  and	  supplement	  supply	  provided	  by	  altruistic	  donors	  (Arrow	  1972,	  Perry	  1980,	  S.H.D.	  
1985,	   Mahoney	   2000,	   Becker	   and	   Elias	   2007).	   In	   a	   recent	   field	   experiment,	   Lacetera,	   et	   al.	  
(2012)	   found	   that	   offering	   economic	   incentives	   increased	   blood	   donations.	   	   However,	  
opponents	  of	  a	  market	  solution	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  commoditization	  of	  organs	  may	  actually	  
crowd	   out	   altruistic	   motivations	   and	   thereby	   decrease	   the	   total	   quantity	   supplied	   (Titmuss	  
1970,	  Singer	  1973,	  DeJong	  et	  al	  1995,	  Byrne	  and	  Thompson	  2001).	  	  Others	  have	  highlighted	  the	  
potential	  negative	  distributional	  consequences	  of	  organ	  markets	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  injustice	  of	  
a	   system	   in	   which	   sales	   are	   undertaken	   primarily	   by	   the	   poor	   and	   desperate	   (Borna	   1987,	  
Archard	  2002,	  Satz	  2008).	  	  
Jasper	   et	   al	   (2004)	   correctly	   point	   out	   that	   “nothing	   short	   of	   a	   market	   test	   can	  
demonstrate	   conclusively	   the	   impact	   that	   incentives	   would	   have	   on	   the	   supply	   of	   donated	  
organs.”(p.	  384),	  but	  for	  obvious	  reasons,	  policy	  makers	  are	  reluctant	  to	  implement	  such	  field	  
experiments.	   	  However,	  the	   issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  markets	  crowd	  out	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	   is	  
much	  broader	  than	  the	  specific	  application	  of	  transplantable	  organs.	  	  In	  other	  settings	  there	  is	  
evidence	  that	  market	  incentives	  crowd	  out	  donations	  and	  pro-­‐social	  behavior.	  	  In	  a	  well-­‐known	  
study	  by	  Gneezy	  and	  Rustichini	  (2000),	  when	  a	  day	  care	  introduced	  small	  fines	  for	  parents	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





were	   late	  picking	  up	   their	   children,	   the	  number	  of	   children	   remaining	   late	   increased.	   	   This	   is	  
despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   price	   for	   being	   late	   increased.	   Recent	   research	   by	   Falk	   and	   Szech	  
(2013)	  also	  suggests	  that	   introducing	  market	   incentives	  reduces	  the	  price	  at	  which	   individuals	  
are	   willing	   to	   allow	   laboratory	   mice	   to	   be	   killed.	   Similarly,	   Frey	   and	   Oberholzer-­‐Gee	   (1997)	  
report	   that	   survey	   respondents	   were	   less	   willing	   to	   tolerate	   hazardous	   waste	   in	   their	  
community	   if	   the	   residents	  were	   to	   be	   compensated	   for	   its	   presence	   than	   if	   they	  were	   not.	  	  
Frey	   (1997)	   argues	   that	   such	  behavior	   is	   being	   driven	  by	   both	   explicit	  market	   incentives	   and	  
internal	  intrinsic	  motivations.	  	  Brekke,	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  develop	  a	  model	  in	  which	  agents	  value	  their	  
social	  responsibility,	  but	  this	  perceived	  responsibility	  varies	  with	  public	  policy	  decisions.	  	  Their	  
model	  “implies	  that	  economic	  incentives	  for	  voluntary	  contributions	  may	  have	  adverse	  effects	  
on	  contributions.	  Public	  policy	  affects	  behavior	  not	  only	  through	  its	  effect	  on	  relative	  prices	  and	  
budget	  and/or	  time	  constraints,	  but	  also	  through	  the	  policy’s	  effects	  on	  individuals’	  perception	  
of	  the	  morally	  ideal	  action.”	  (p.	  1969).	  	  	  
Bénabou	   and	   Tirole	   (2006)	   develop	   an	   alternative	   model	   where	   the	   motivation	   to	  
charity	  is	  based	  upon	  how	  others	  view	  the	  decision	  maker.	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  
explicit	   rewards	   for	   pro-­‐social	   behavior	   could	   discourage	   the	   behavior	   if	   others	   are	   likely	   to	  
perceive	  that	  the	  person	  is	  engaging	  in	  the	  ostensibly	  pro-­‐social	  act	  in	  order	  to	  take	  advantage	  
of	   the	   explicit	   rewards.	   	   Ariely,	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   find	   support	   for	   this	   type	  of	  motivation	   in	   a	   lab	  
experiment	  varying	  the	  observability	  of	  gifts	  to	  charities.	  	  	  Similarly,	  several	  other	  studies	  have	  
found	   that	   people	   behave	   in	   a	  more	  pro-­‐social	  manner	  when	   their	   actions	   can	  be	  observed,	  
which	   provides	   additional	   evidence	   that	   they	   are	   concerned	  with	   how	   others	   perceive	   them	  
(see	  Andreoni	  and	  Petrie	  2004	  and	  Soetevent	  2005	  for	  lab	  and	  field	  evidence,	  respectively).	  	  	  
This	  paper	  adds	   to	   the	   literature	  exploring	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  market	   incentives	   crowd	  out	  
one	   kind	   of	   pro-­‐social	   behavior	   in	   a	   context	   where	   the	   extrinsic	   motives	   are	   endogenously	  
determined	  by	  a	  market,	  and	  agents	  have	  complete	  information	  about	  the	  benefits	  of	  their	  pro-­‐
social	   behavior.	   In	   particular,	   our	   experiment	   provides	   a	   direct	   test	   of	   the	   hypothesis	   that	  
markets	  crowd	  out	  charitable	  giving	  in	  a	  setting	  that	  captures	  some	  of	  the	  important	  aspects	  of	  




asset	  upon	  their	  “death”.	  As	  such,	  we	  abstract	  away	  from	  the	  costs	  and	  risks	  associated	  with	  
live	   donations.	   However,	   to	   keep	   our	   design	   simple,	   we	   also	   abstract	   away	   from	   issues	   of	  
compatibility,	  quality,	  and	  priority	  which	  are	   important	  concerns	   in	  cadaveric	  organ	  donation.	  
One	  important	  issue	  that	  we	  address	  directly	   is	  the	  concern	  expressed	  by	  many	  opponents	  of	  
organ	  donation	  that	  market	  incentives	  may	  disproportionately	  impact	  the	  relatively	  poor.	  Our	  
design	   allows	   us	   to	   evaluate	   whether	   market	   incentives	   have	   differential	   effects	   across	  
(experimentally	  induced)	  relative	  wealth	  levels.	  Given	  the	  level	  of	  abstraction	  and	  the	  relatively	  
small	  stakes	  of	  the	  laboratory,	  we	  realize	  that	  some	  readers	  may	  not	  agree	  with	  our	  preferred	  
interpretation	  that	  our	  setting	  reasonably	  approximates	  cadaveric	  organ	  transplant.	  	  Of	  course,	  
any	   laboratory	  experiment	  or	  theoretical	  model	  must	  make	  abstractions,	  and	  we	  believe	  that	  
our	  setting	  captures	  the	  general	  properties	  of	  large,	  discrete	  donation	  decisions	  for	  assets	  that	  
outlive	  their	  usefulness	  to	  their	  current	  owners,	  of	  which	  organ	  transplants	  from	  the	  deceased	  
are	  but	  one	  example.	  	  	  
	  The	   next	   section	   describes	   the	   experimental	   design	   used	   to	   address	   these	   issues.	   	   A	  
separate	  section	  discusses	  the	  behavioral	  findings	  that	  markets	  need	  not	  crowd	  out	  donations,	  
but	  do	  disproportionately	  induce	  the	  poor	  to	  participate.	  	  	  A	  final	  section	  concludes.	  	  	  	  	  
1. Experimental	  Design	  
To	  explore	  the	  impact	  of	  market	  incentives	  on	  pro-­‐social	  behavior,	  we	  employ	  a	  3x1	  between	  
subjects	  experimental	  design	  where	  we	  vary	  the	  economic	  incentives	  of	  engaging	  in	  pro-­‐social	  
behavior	  using	  an	  overlapping	  generations	  framework.	  	  In	  this	  setting,	  each	  person	  is	  endowed	  
with	  an	  asset	  that	  will	  generate	  a	  payment	  for	  either	  one	  or	  three	  periods,	  but	  each	  person	  is	  
only	  able	  to	  claim	  payoffs	  for	  up	  to	  two	  periods.	  	  After	  receiving	  two	  payments,	  those	  with	  an	  
asset	  that	  lasts	  for	  three	  periods	  can	  transfer	  it	  to	  someone	  whose	  asset	  only	  lasts	  one	  period	  
and	  thus	  could	  claim	  an	  additional	  payoff.	   	  The	  asset	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  any	   large,	  discrete	  
item	  that	  has	  value	  to	  someone	  else	  beyond	  the	  point	  that	  it	  holds	  value	  to	  the	  original	  owner,	  




there	   is	   a	   clear	   increase	   in	   social	  welfare	   from	  doing	   so.	   	   This	   cost	   can	  be	   thought	   of	   as	   the	  
hassle	  of	  registering	  as	  a	  donor	  or	  as	  disgust	  at	  the	  thought	  of	  having	  one’s	  organ	  harvested.3	  	  
In	  each	  laboratory	  session	  there	  are	  ten	  subjects	  who	  take	  turns	  being	  active	  for	  two	  periods.	  	  
This	  framework	  allows	  us	  to	  collect	  multiple	  observations	  from	  each	  individual	  and	  provides	  an	  
intuitive	  means	  for	  subject	  to	  understand	  the	  structure	  of	  decision	  problem.	  	  In	  the	  first	  period	  
of	  a	  session	  there	  are	  three	  “Young”	  people	  and	  three	  “Old”	  people.	  The	  other	  four	  people	  are	  
inactive.4	   	   In	   the	   second	   period,	   three	   of	   the	   people	   who	   were	   inactive	   in	   the	   first	   period	  
become	  “Young,”	   the	   three	  people	  who	  were	  Young	   in	   the	   first	  period	  become	  Old,	   and	   the	  
three	  people	  who	  were	  Old	  in	  the	  first	  period	  become	  inactive.	  	  This	  process	  repeats	  after	  each	  
period	  and	  is	  summarized	  in	  Figure	  1	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  single	  subject.	  	  To	  avoid	  issues	  
associated	  with	  repeated	  play	  games,	  each	  Old	  person	  must	  be	  inactive	  for	  one	  period	  before	  
becoming	  active	  again,	   the	  number	  of	   inactive	  people	   is	   larger	   than	  the	  next	  generation,	  and	  
there	   is	   no	  way	   to	   identify	   other	   people	   across	   lives.5	   Furthermore,	   subjects	   are	   paid	   based	  
upon	  one	  randomly	  chosen	  life.	  	  
Each	  period	  that	  an	  active	  subject	  holds	  a	  useable	  asset	  they	  receive	  a	  specified	  payment,	  but	  
the	  payment	  depends	  on	  the	  subject’s	  type.	  	  Half	  of	  the	  subjects	  in	  the	  session	  are	  “Wealthy”	  
and	  half	  are	  “Poor.”	  Wealthy	  people	  receive	  a	  payment	  of	  $8	  for	  holding	  a	  useable	  asset	  when	  
they	  are	  Young	  and	  $5	  for	  holding	  a	  useable	  asset	  when	  they	  are	  Old.	   	  Poor	  people	  receive	  a	  
payment	  of	  $2	  for	  holding	  a	  useable	  asset	  when	  they	  are	  Young	  and	  $5	  for	  holding	  a	  useable	  
asset	   when	   they	   are	   Old.	   	   Thus,	   both	  Wealthy	   and	   Poor	   people	   have	   the	   same	   value	   for	   a	  
useable	  asset	  when	  they	  are	  Old.	  	  This	  is	  a	  critical	  feature	  of	  the	  design	  so	  that	  income	  levels	  do	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Even	  for	  live	  donations	  such	  as	  kidneys	  where	  the	  nominal	  cost	  may	  be	  quite	  high,	  in	  relative	  terms	  these	  costs	  
are	  small	  compared	  to	  the	  value	  created	  for	  the	  recipient.	  	  Given	  the	  types	  of	  costs	  that	  are	  being	  modeled,	  the	  
donor	  bears	  the	  cost	  whether	  or	  not	  anyone	  actually	  uses	  the	  asset.	  	  The	  hassle	  of	  giving	  furniture	  to	  a	  charity	  
does	  not	  depend	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  furniture	  is	  used	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  any	  psychological	  cost	  incurred	  while	  
alive	  associated	  with	  agreeing	  to	  be	  an	  organ	  donor	  at	  death	  is	  not	  refunded	  if	  one’s	  organs	  are	  not	  harvested.	  	  For	  
simplicity,	  recipients	  bore	  the	  same	  cost	  from	  being	  willing	  to	  receive	  an	  asset.	  	  This	  cost	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  
loss	  of	  pride	  in	  having	  to	  get	  help	  or	  psychological	  disgust	  in	  the	  case	  of	  taking	  steps	  to	  receive	  someone	  else’s	  
organ.	  	  
4	  While	  the	  experiment	  was	  conducted	  in	  a	  neutral	  frame,	  terms	  such	  as	  “Young”	  and	  “Old”	  were	  used	  to	  facilitate	  
subject	  understanding	  of	  the	  decision	  problem.	  	  	  	  
5	  This	  approach	  is	  commonly	  used	  in	  macroeconomics	  experiments	  where	  the	  economy	  outlives	  individual	  agents.	  




not	   affect	   the	   social	   gains	   that	   occur	   from	   the	   transfer	   of	   an	   asset	   while	   still	   allowing	   for	  
endogenous	  wealth	  differences.	  	  Inactive	  people	  cannot	  hold	  any	  assets.	  	  Each	  subject	  remains	  
Poor	  or	  Wealthy	  throughout	  the	  entire	  experimental	  session;	  thus	  generations	  may	  differ	  in	  the	  
number	  of	  Wealthy	  and	  Poor	  people.	  	  	  
The	  two	  types	  of	  assets	  were	  denoted	  as	  yellow	  and	  green.	  	  Yellow	  assets	  last	  for	  one	  period.	  
Green	  assets	  last	  for	  two	  periods	  before	  turning	  yellow	  and	  lasting	  one	  additional	  period.	  	  After	  
one	  period	  yellow	  assets	  become	  red	  assets,	  which	  have	  a	  value	  of	  $0	  to	  both	  agent	  types.	  	  In	  
each	  new	  generation,	  two	  of	  the	  four	  inactive	  people	  are	  endowed	  with	  new	  green	  assets	  and	  
one	  person	  is	  endowed	  with	  a	  yellow	  asset;	  hence	  the	  50%	  and	  25%	  chance	  of	  receiving	  a	  green	  
or	   yellow	  asset	   respectively	   in	   Figure	  1.	   	   In	   this	  way	   there	  are	  always	   two	  people	  who	   could	  
transfer	  an	  asset	  to	  someone	  to	  someone	  in	  need	  of	  one.	  	  	  
Each	   group	  of	   subjects	   first	   participates	   in	   20	   periods	  where	   potential	   donors	   and	   recipients	  
face	   an	   opportunity	   cost	   of	   engaging	   in	   the	   donation	   process.	   	   This	   cost	   is	   implemented	   as	  
forgoing	   a	   lottery	  with	   a	  one	   in	  one	   thousand	   chance	  of	   receiving	  $100.6	   In	   Figure	  1,	   dotted	  
arrows	  denote	  paths	   along	  which	   the	   cost	   is	   incurred.	   	  While	   the	  potential	   prize	   is	   relatively	  
large,	  a	  moment’s	  reflection	  yields	  that	  the	  expected	  value	  of	  the	   lottery	   is	   just	  ten	  cents,	  far	  
less	   than	   the	   $5	   the	   asset	   is	   worth	   to	   someone	   else.7	   For	   potential	   donors,	   the	   lottery	   cost	  
structure	   is	   meant	   to	   induce	   a	   difficult	   to	   justify,	   knee-­‐jerk	   reaction	   against	   giving	   up	   one’s	  
asset.	  	  After	  all,	  market	  incentives	  need	  not	  be	  considered	  if	  charitable	  efforts	  are	  sufficient	  to	  
meet	  needs;	  nor	  would	  donations	  be	  desirable	   if	  charitable	  efforts	  generate	  net	  social	   losses.	  	  
The	  expected	  exchange	  rate	  of	  1	  to	  50	  from	  one’s	  own	  payoff	  to	  someone	  else’s	  is	  well	  beyond	  
the	   level	   that	   Andreoni	   and	   Miller	   (2002)	   found	   led	   to	   considerable	   altruistic	   giving.	   	   This	  
feature	  is	  important	  because	  some	  baseline	  level	  of	  charity	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  be	  potentially	  
crowded	   out	   by	   the	   market.	   	   We	   include	   the	   opportunity	   cost	   for	   potential	   recipients	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Subjects	  playing	  the	  lottery	  tried	  to	  guess	  which	  integer	  from	  0	  to	  999	  would	  be	  randomly	  selected	  by	  the	  
computer.	  	  	  	  
7	  Risk-­‐averse	  individuals	  will	  value	  the	  lottery	  at	  less	  than	  a	  dime,	  and	  previous	  experimental	  work	  has	  routinely	  
found	  that	  people	  behave	  as	  if	  they	  are	  risk	  averse	  (see	  e.g.	  Holt	  and	  Laury	  2002).	  	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  
people	  tend	  to	  overweight	  low	  probability	  events,	  but	  even	  treating	  the	  lottery	  as	  a	  1	  in	  100	  chance	  of	  earning	  




symmetry,	   though	   this	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   cost	   of	   seeking	   out	   charity,	   or	   as	   a	  model	   of	  
psychic	  costs	  of	  being	  willing	  to	  accept	  charity,	  or	  even	  disgust	  at	  having	  someone	  else’s	  organ	  
in	  your	  body.	  	  
After	   the	   first	  20	  periods,	  groups	  of	   subjects	  either	  continue	   in	   this	  Baseline	  environment	   for	  
another	  20	  periods	  or	  participate	  in	  one	  of	  the	  two	  other	  treatments.	  	  In	  the	  Market	  treatment,	  
a	   market	   is	   introduced	   that	   allows	   people	   to	   offer	   to	   sell	   their	   assets.	   	   Donations	   are	   still	  
possible	   in	   this	   treatment	   as	   one	   could	   offer	   to	   sell	   an	   asset	   at	   a	   price	   of	   zero.	   	   The	  NoCost	  
treatment	  eliminates	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  donating	  an	  asset.	   	  While	  Market	   is	   the	  primary	  
treatment	  of	  interest	  in	  determining	  if	  introducing	  market	  incentives	  crowd	  out	  or	  supplement	  
charitable	  giving,	  the	  NoCost	  treatment	  provides	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  subjects	  are	  
pro-­‐social	  and	  the	  lottery	  cost	  is	  successful	  at	  discouraging	  charitable	  giving.	  	  	  
In	  periods	   in	  which	   there	  was	  no	  market,	  Old	  people	  who	  owned	  a	  green	  asset	   (i.e.	  an	  asset	  
that	  was	  turning	  yellow	  and	  would	   last	  one	  more	  period)	  could	  choose	  to	  either	  “Donate	  My	  
Asset”	  or	  “Keep	  my	  Asset”	  with	  the	  default	  choice	  being	  to	  donate	  the	  asset.8	   	  Young	  people	  
with	  yellow	  assets	  chose	  between	  “Accept	  an	  Asset”	  and	  “Keep	  my	  Asset.”	  When	  there	  was	  an	  
active	   market	   for	   assets,	   Old	   people	   with	   green	   assets	   chose	   between	   “Sell	   my	   Asset”	   and	  
“Keep	  my	  Asset.”	  	  If	  the	  subject	  selected	  “Sell	  my	  Asset”	  they	  also	  had	  to	  enter	  an	  asking	  price	  
between	  $0	  and	  $5	  in	  cents.	  	  Similarly,	  Young	  people	  with	  yellow	  assets	  chose	  between	  “Buy	  an	  
Asset”	   and	   “Keep	  my	   Asset”	   and	   those	  who	   opted	   to	   buy	   an	   asset	   had	   to	   enter	   a	   bid,	   also	  
between	  $0	  and	  $5	  in	  cents.9	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Previous	  work	  by	  Samuelson	  and	  Zeckhauser	  (1988)	  has	  indentified	  a	  “status	  quo	  bias”	  in	  which	  people	  are	  likely	  
to	  maintain	  the	  default	  choice.	  	  This	  has	  been	  the	  impetus	  for	  organ	  donation	  policies	  in	  Europe	  where	  a	  person	  is	  
by	  default	  an	  organ	  donor	  unless	  they	  take	  active	  steps	  to	  not	  be	  an	  organ	  donor.	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  Abadie	  
and	  Gay	  (2006)	  provide	  evidence	  that	  this	  policy	  increases	  the	  supply	  of	  transplantable	  organs.	  As	  an	  experimental	  
design	  choice,	  this	  should	  strengthen	  any	  claim	  that	  the	  market	  “works”	  since	  it	  is	  competing	  against	  the	  best	  
“real-­‐world”	  alternative	  policy.	  
9	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  specific	  market	  institution	  employed	  may	  impact	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  market	  
encourages	  or	  crowds	  out	  pro-­‐social	  behavior,	  so	  we	  chose	  an	  institution	  that	  tends	  to	  generate	  a	  relatively	  low	  
volume	  of	  trade.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  induce	  relatively	  less	  incentive	  to	  donate;	  thus,	  our	  design	  may	  provide	  a	  lower	  
bound	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  market	  incentives	  on	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	  in	  this	  setting.	  	  Here,	  market	  prices	  were	  
determined	  as	  follows.	  	  	  If	  there	  was	  no	  bid	  or	  no	  ask	  or	  the	  lowest	  ask	  was	  above	  the	  bid,	  then	  there	  was	  no	  trade.	  	  




After	   completing	   the	  directions,	   subjects	  answered	  a	   series	  of	   comprehension	  questions,	  and	  
an	  experimenter	  went	  over	  the	  answers	  and	  privately	  corrected	  any	  mistakes.	  	  Once	  all	  of	  the	  
subjects	   had	   answered	   the	   questions	   correctly,	   the	   experiment	   began.	   	   After	   20	   periods	   (19	  
complete	  generations)	  of	   the	  baseline	  condition	  had	  been	  completed,	   subjects	   in	   the	  Market	  
and	   NoCost	   treatment	   were	   given	   additional	   instructions	   for	   the	   last	   20	   periods	   of	   the	  
experiment	  starting	  when	  the	  20th	  generation	  became	  Old.	  	  For	  consistency	  across	  treatments,	  
subjects	   in	   the	  Baseline	   condition	  were	   also	   paused	   and	   restarted	   at	   the	   half	  way	   point.	   	   In	  
order	  to	  limit	  the	  potential	  influence	  of	  forward-­‐looking	  strategic	  considerations,	  subjects	  were	  
not	  informed	  of	  the	  number	  of	  periods	  in	  the	  instructions;	  nor	  were	  subjects	  in	  the	  Market	  and	  
NoCost	   treatments	   initially	   informed	  that	   the	  experiment	  would	  have	  two	  parts.	  Copies	  of	  all	  
directions	  and	  the	  comprehension	  questions	  are	  available	  in	  the	  appendix.	  	  	  
The	   average	   salient	   payment	   was	   approximately	   $9.25	   and	   the	   experiment	   lasted	  
approximately	   45	   minutes.	   	   Each	   subject	   also	   received	   a	   $7	   participation	   payment.10	   	   Four	  
replications	  of	  each	  of	  the	  three	  treatments	  were	  conducted	  with	  a	  total	  of	  120	  undergraduate	  
students	   from	  Chapman	  University,	   a	   small	   private	   school	   in	   southern	  California	   (53%	  male).	  	  
Some	   subjects	   had	   previously	   participated	   in	   other	   economics	   experiments,	   but	   none	   had	  
participated	  in	  any	  related	  studies.	  
2. Behavioral	  Results	  
Our	  data	   consist	  of	  480	  periods	  and	  960	  donation	  decisions	   from	  12	   independent	   sessions.11	  	  
Figure	   2	   displays	   smoothed	   time	   series	   of	   average	   probabilities	   that	   at	   least	   one	   asset	   was	  
donated	  by	  treatment.	  Panel	  (a)	  pools	  the	  data	  for	  the	  pre-­‐treatment	  phase	  when	  all	  sessions	  
were	   in	   the	  Baseline	   treatment	   (periods	   1-­‐20),	   and	   panel	   (b)	   displays	   the	   data	   for	   the	   post-­‐
treatment	  phase	   for	  all	   three	   treatments	   separately	   (periods	  21-­‐40).	  From	  the	   figure,	  we	  can	  
see	  a	  pattern	  of	  cooperative	  decay	   in	   the	  Baseline	   treatment	  prior	   to	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of	  the	  bid	  and	  highest	  ask	  if	  there	  were	  two	  asks.	  	  In	  each	  period	  with	  a	  market,	  all	  of	  the	  subjects	  in	  the	  session	  
observed	  a	  summary	  report	  of	  any	  bids,	  asks,	  or	  prices.	  	  	  
10	  Subjects	  also	  received	  $5	  for	  completing	  a	  survey	  after	  the	  experiment.	  	  The	  survey	  focused	  on	  attitudes	  towards	  
markets	  for	  organs.	  	  	  
11	  All	  statistics	  and	  graphics	  created	  using	  R:	  A	  Language	  and	  Environment	  for	  Statistical	  Computing	  (2009).	  




Market	   or	   the	  No	   Cost	  manipulations	   (see	   panel	   a).	   Similar	   to	   standard	   public	   goods	   games	  
which	   also	   deal	   with	   the	   tradeoff	   between	   own	   and	   others’	   payoffs,	   we	   observe	   a	   “restart	  
effect”	  in	  the	  Baseline	  treatment,	  but	  the	  data	  are	  quite	  similar	  in	  periods	  1-­‐20	  and	  21-­‐40.	  More	  
importantly,	   there	   is	   a	   notable	   increase	   in	   donation	   rates	   with	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  
treatments	  (see	  panel	  b).	  
The	   primary	   focus	   of	   the	   paper	   is	   the	   degree	   to	  which	  market	   incentives	   crowd	   out	   private	  
incentives.	  	  To	  address	  this	  we	  estimate	  the	  linear	  probability	  model	  using	  OLS	  in	  equation	  (1)	  
where	  Supplyit	  takes	  a	  value	  of	  1	  if	  at	  least	  one	  asset	  is	  supplied	  in	  session	  i	  during	  period	  t	  and	  
0	   otherwise.12	   Since	   there	   is	   a	  maximum	   of	   one	   unit	   of	   demand	   in	   any	   period,	   this	   dummy	  
variable	  indicates	  whether	  sufficient	  supply	  is	  available	  to	  satisfy	  any	  demand.	  While	  we	  could	  
examine	  individual	  donation	  rates	  here,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  welfare,	   it	   is	   less	  important	  
whether	  each	  individual	  donates	  than	  whether	  there	  is	  sufficient	  supply	  available	  to	  those	  who	  
are	   in	   need.13	   The	   independent	   variables	   include	   dummies	   for	   the	   Market	   and	   NoCost	  
treatments,	  the	  period,	  and	  a	  dummy	  variable	  called	  SecondHalf	  that	  takes	  a	  value	  of	  1	   if	  the	  
observation	   was	   from	   period	   t	   >	   20,	   and	   we	   cluster	   standard	   errors	   at	   the	   session	   level	   to	  
control	  for	  repeated	  measures.	   	   	  Therefore,	  the	  constant	  term	  captures	  giving	  during	  the	  first	  
half	  of	   the	  experiment	  when	  everyone	  experienced	   the	  baseline	  and	   the	  SecondHalf	   variable	  
captures	  any	  change	   in	  behavior	  between	   the	   first	  and	  second	  half	  of	   the	  experiment	   that	   is	  
common	   to	   all	   three	   treatments.	   The	   treatment	   specific	   dummies	   capture	   deviations	   of	  
behavior	  from	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  baseline.	  	  	  	  
Supplyit	  	  =	  γ0	  +	  γ1Marketit	  +γ2NoCostit	  +	  γ3Periodt	  +	  γ4SecondHalft	  +	  εit	   	   (1)	  
The	  results	  of	  this	  estimation	  with	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  at	  the	  session	  level	  are	  shown	  in	  
Table	   1.	   	   The	   main	   finding	   is	   that	   the	   Market	   treatment	   leads	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   supply	   as	  
captured	  by	  the	  positive	  and	  significant	  coefficient	  on	  Market	  (γ1)	   in	  Table	  1.	  	  This	  is	  the	  basis	  
for	  finding	  1.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  We	  report	  OLS	  results	  to	  ease	  interpretation	  by	  providing	  a	  direct	  estimate	  of	  treatment	  marginal	  effects,	  but	  
estimated	  treatment	  effects	  are	  similar	  with	  logistic	  regression	  and	  probit.	  We	  also	  get	  similar	  estimates	  if	  we	  use	  
panel	  regression	  with	  random	  effects	  for	  each	  session	  and	  robust	  standard	  errors.	  




Main	  Finding	  1:	  Introducing	  a	  market	  does	  not	  crowd	  out	  charitable	  giving.	  	  Instead,	  introducing	  
a	  market	  leads	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  available	  assets	  for	  transfer.	  	  	  
Several	  additional	  aspects	  of	  Table	  1	  are	  worth	  noting	  as	  well.	   	  First,	   the	  constant	  term,	  γ0,	   is	  
positive	  and	  significant	  which	   indicates	   that	  absent	   the	  market	   incentives,	  people	  are	  making	  
donations.	   	   However,	   γ0	   is	   also	   significantly	   less	   than	   1	   (p-­‐value	   <	   0.01).	   	   	   This	   is	   important	  
because	  it	  indicates	  the	  experiment	  was	  successful	  in	  creating	  an	  environment	  where	  donations	  
covered	  some	  but	  not	  all	  of	  the	  need.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  experiment	  successfully	  created	  a	  situation	  
where	   a	   market	   could	   either	   crowd	   out	   charitable	   giving	   or	   supplement	   it.	   	   Similarly,	   the	  
positive	   and	   significant	   coefficient	   for	   the	   No	   Cost	   treatment	   (γ2)	   indicates	   that	   potential	  
suppliers	  in	  the	  Baseline	  and	  Market	  treatments	  were	  not	  withholding	  units	  because	  of	  spiteful	  
or	   competitive	   preferences	   but	   rather	   because	   of	   the	   cost,	   despite	   the	   50	   to	   1	   increase	   in	  
expected	   value	   from	   transferring	   the	   asset.	   	   The	   lack	   of	   significance	   for	   Period	   (γ3)	   or	  
SecondHalf	  (γ4)	  suggests	  that	  the	  treatment	  effects	  are	  not	  due	  to	  learning	  or	  other	  changes	  in	  
behavior	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Table	  1	  also	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  estimating	  equation	  (2),	  a	  similar	  regression	  to	  that	  reported	  
for	  Supply	  but	  where	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  period	  Demand.	  	  	  
Demandit	  	  =	  φ0	  +	  φ1Marketit	  + φ2NoCostit	  +	  φ3Periodt	  +	  φ4SecondHalft	  +	  εit	   	   (2)	  
The	  results	  of	   this	  regression	   indicate	  that	  the	  market	  does	  not	   induce	  more	  demand.	   	  Recall	  
that	   those	   in	   need	   of	   an	   asset	   also	   incur	   an	   opportunity	   cost	   for	   trying	   to	   acquire	   one.	  	  
Unsurprisingly,	   if	   the	  opportunity	  cost	   is	  removed	  demanders	  virtually	  always	  accept	  an	  asset	  
(p-­‐value	  =	  0.39,	  for	  a	  Wald	  test	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  φ0	  +φ2	  +	  φ4	  =	  1).	  	  As	  on	  the	  supply	  side,	  on	  
the	  demand	  side	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  behavior	  changing	  over	  time	  (i.e.	  neither	  φ3	  nor	  φ4	  are	  
significantly	  different	  from	  0).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
We	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  distributional	  effects	  that	  markets	  may	  have	  on	  supply.	   	   In	  particular,	  we	  
want	   to	   know	   if	   the	   observed	   increase	   in	   supply	   when	   a	   market	   is	   introduced	   is	  
disproportionately	   driven	   by	   the	   relatively	   poor.	   Figure	   3	   displays	   the	   mean	   individual	  




The	   data	   are	   pooled	   for	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   experiment	   since	   all	   sessions	   had	   identical	  
procedures.	  Clearly,	  poor	  subjects	  exhibit	  a	   larger	   increase	   in	  supply	   in	   the	  Market	  treatment	  
than	   wealthy	   subjects,	   while	   the	   effects	   are	   similar	   for	   the	   NoCost	   treatment.	   To	   provide	  
statistical	   support	  we	  again	   rely	  on	  OLS	   regression	   to	  estimate	  of	  equation	   (3).14	  Rather	   than	  
equation	   (1),	  which	   considered	   supply	   at	   the	  period	   level,	   here	   the	  dependent	   variable	   is	   an	  
individual’s	  choice,	  so	  Supplyjit	  equals	  1	  if	  individual	  j	  in	  session	  i	  during	  period	  t	  opted	  to	  supply	  
an	  asset.	  	  Poorj	  takes	  a	  value	  of	  1	  if	  subject	  j	  was	  Poor	  and	  takes	  a	  value	  of	  0	  otherwise.	  	  Fixed	  
effects	  (σi)	  are	  included	  for	  each	  session,	  and	  we	  cluster	  standard	  errors	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  
to	  control	  for	  repeated	  measures.	  	  	  
Supplyjit	  	  =	  δ0	  +	  δ1Marketit	  + δ2NoCostit	  +	  δ3Poorj	  +δ4Marketit×Poorj	  +	  δ5NoCostit×Poorj	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  (3)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	   estimation	   results,	   shown	   in	   Table	   2,	   indicate	   that	   relative	   wealth	   does	   not	   impact	   the	  
decision	   to	   donate	   in	   the	   Baseline	   treatment	   or	   in	   the	   No	   Cost	   treatment	   (δ3	   and	   δ5	   not	  
statistically	  different	   from	  0).	   	  However,	   relative	  wealth	  does	  affect	   the	  decision	  to	  supply	  an	  
asset	   in	   the	  Market	   treatment.	   	   The	   wealthy	   are	   no	  more	   likely	   to	   supply	   an	   asset	   when	   a	  
market	   is	   introduced	   (δ1	   is	   not	   statistically	   different	   from	  0),	   but	   the	  poor	   are	  more	   likely	   to	  
supply	  an	  asset	  when	  a	  market	  is	  introduced	  (δ4	  is	  positive	  and	  significant,	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.03,	  one-­‐
sided	  test15).	  	  This	  is	  the	  support	  for	  the	  second	  main	  finding.	  
Main	  Finding	  2:	   	  The	   introduction	  of	  a	  market	  encourages	  the	  relatively	  poor	   to	  supply	  assets	  
while	   the	  decisions	  of	   the	   relatively	  wealthy	  are	  not	  affected	  by	   the	   introduction	  of	  a	  market.	  	  
Thus,	  the	  increase	  in	  supply	  observed	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  market	   is	  driven	  by	  actions	  of	  
the	  relatively	  poor.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  As	  before,	  our	  main	  results	  are	  essentially	  the	  same	  if	  we	  estimate	  this	  model	  with	  logit	  or	  probit.	  We	  prefer	  OLS	  
because	  it	  facilitates	  easy	  interpretation	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  treatment	  effects.	  	  
15	  Given	  the	  directional	  nature	  of	  the	  alternative	  hypothesis	  that	  markets	  induce	  the	  poor	  to	  give,	  a	  one-­‐sided	  test	  
is	  appropriate.	  	  A	  two-­‐sided	  test	  is	  marginally	  significant	  (p	  =	  0.06)	  but	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effect	  is	  large,	  




This	  result	   is	  particularly	  striking	  given	  that	  relative	  wealth	  within	  the	  experiment	  is	  randomly	  
assigned	  and	  the	  stakes	  involved	  likely	  represent	  only	  a	  miniscule	  percent	  of	  subjects’	  personal	  
wealth.	  Yet,	  those	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  “poor”	  behave	  differently	  than	  the	  “wealthy”.16	  
Table	  2	  also	  reveals	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  removing	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  supplying	  an	  asset	  does	  
not	  differentially	  affect	  the	  poor	  (δ5	   is	  not	  different	   from	  0).	  The	  other	  coefficients	   in	  Table	  2	  
are	  consistent	  with	  those	  found	  for	  estimating	  equation	  (1).	  
3. Conclusions	  
We	  design	  a	  laboratory	  experiment	  with	  overlapping	  generations	  to	  study	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  
market	   incentives	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   crowd	   out	   charitable	   motives	   versus	   providing	   a	  
supplemental	   incentive	   to	   increase	   the	   available	   supply	   of	   a	   needed	   asset.	   	   Importantly	   our	  
experimental	  setting	  is	  one	  in	  which	  it	  is	  socially	  optimal	  for	  assets	  to	  be	  transferred	  after	  they	  
have	  outlived	  their	  usefulness	  to	  the	  original	  owner,	  but	  charity	  alone	  is	  only	  partially	  able	  to	  
solve	  this	  problem.	  	  Our	  results	  clearly	  demonstrate	  that	  market	  incentives	  need	  not	  crowd	  out	  
pro-­‐social	  behavior.	  	  This	  result	  is	  important	  because	  some	  recent	  evidence	  has	  suggested	  the	  
opposite	  effect	  will	  result	  from	  the	  introduction	  of	  markets.	  	  As	  there	  are	  more	  calls	  for	  market	  
solutions,	   such	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   transplantable	   organs,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   the	  
dynamics	  at	  play	  before	  making	  policy	  decisions,	  which	  in	  the	  case	  of	  organs	  can	  literally	  be	  a	  
matter	  of	  life	  and	  death.	  
While	   our	   laboratory	   experiments	   are	   stylized,	   we	   do	   find	   that	   the	   introduction	   of	   market	  
incentives	  has	  a	  differential	  effect	  on	  relatively	  wealthy	  and	  poor	  participants.	  Specifically,	  we	  
find	  evidence	   that	  market	   incentives	   induce	   the	   relatively	  poor	   to	  donate	  while	  not	  having	  a	  
significant	   effect	   on	   the	   choices	   of	  wealthy	   donors.	   	   That	   such	   a	   pattern	  would	   emerge	   is	   a	  
concern	  that	  has	  been	  voiced	  in	  many	  policy	  debates	  –	  including	  being	  offered	  as	  an	  argument	  
against	  the	  creation	  of	  organ	  markets	  out	  of	  fear	  that	  the	  poor	  would	  be	  harvested	  for	  the	  rich.	  	  
While	   our	   experimental	   markets	   abstract	   away	   from	   moral	   and	   ethical	   concerns	   that	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




present	   in	   organ	   markets	   (and	   the	   stakes	   are	   much	   lower),	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   observe	   this	  
distributional	  effect	  when	  wealthy	  and	  poor	  only	  differ	  by	  a	  few	  dollars	  is	  striking.	  	  	  
We	  conclude	  with	  a	  note	  of	  caution	  that	  our	  results	  like	  any	  study	  are,	  to	  some	  degree,	  specific	  
to	  the	  experimental	  context	  investigated.	  In	  general,	  extrapolating	  from	  level	  effects	  observed	  
in	  a	  stylized	  laboratory	  setting	  is	  fraught	  with	  issues;	  though,	  we	  would	  argue	  that	  extrapolating	  
from	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   comparative	   static	   effects	   is	   more	   justified.	   Thus,	   our	   research	  
provides	  evidence	  that	  market	  incentives	  can	  encourage	  charitable	  giving.	  	  	  
Moreover,	   the	   fact	   that	  we	  observe	  no	  crowding	  out	   in	   this	   setting	  does	  not	   imply	   that	   such	  
crowding	  out	  is	  impossible	  in	  other	  settings.	  As	  we	  note	  in	  the	  introduction,	  a	  number	  of	  well-­‐
known	   experiments	   find	   evidence	   that	   market	   incentives	   can	   sometimes	   reduce	   charitable	  
activities.	  While	  our	  finding	  that	  introducing	  incentives	  encourages	  donation	  is	  consistent	  with	  
field	   experimental	   evidence	   on	   blood	   drives	   (Lacetera	   et	   al	   2013)	   and	   lab	   experimental	  
evidence	   on	   organ	   donation	   (Kessler	   and	   Roth	   2012),	   the	   tradeoffs	   between	   different	  
motivations	  behind	  giving	  (e.g.	  warm	  glow	  vs.	  explicit	  incentives)	  may	  be	  different	  in	  different	  
settings	   and	   are	   certain	   to	   vary	   across	   individuals.	   Indeed,	   in	   our	   market	   sessions,	   50%	   of	  
subjects	  increase	  their	  donation	  rate	  upon	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  market,	  while	  32%	  decrease,	  
and	   18%	   remain	   constant,	   suggesting	   considerable	   heterogeneity	   even	   in	   this	   laboratory	  
setting.	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  Table	  1:	  Treatment	  Effects	  on	  Deaths,	  Demand	  and	  Supply	  






























N	   320	   320	  
The	  dependent	  variables	  are	  binary	  and	  indicate	  at	  least	  one	  
asset	  is	  supplied	  or	  demanded	  in	  period	  t	  of	  session	  i.	  	  
Standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  Session	  are	  in	  parentheses.	  	  
***	  p	  ≤	  0.01,	  **	  p	  ≤	  0.05,	  *	  p	  ≤	  0.1	  for	  two	  sided	  test	  of	  null	  
that	  coefficient	  =	  0.	  	  
	   	   	   	  












Table	  2:	  The	  Effects	  of	  Poverty	  on	  the	  Choice	  to	  Supply	  
	   Supplyjit	  
equation	  (3)	  
Constant	   0.44	  (0.09)***	  
Market	   0.003	  (0.11)	  
No	  Cost	   0.20	  (0.11)*	  
Poor	   -­‐0.06	  (0.06)	  
Period	   -­‐0.003	  (0.003)	  
Market	  x	  Poor	   0.32	  (0.17)*	  
No	  Cost	  x	  Poor	   0.07	  (0.15)	  
2nd	  Half	   0.14	  (0.09)	  
2nd	  Half	  x	  Poor	   -­‐0.12	  (0.10)	  
N	   960	  
The	  binary	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  individual	  decision	  of	  person	  j	  in	  period	  t	  of	  session	  i.	  	  	  
OLS	  regression	  with	  session	  fixed	  effects.	  Clustered	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	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   Figure	  2:	  Time	  Series	  of	  Supply	  Probability	  by	  Treatment,	  Smoothing	  Splines.	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Appendix	  A:	  Experiment	  Instructions	  
This	   is	   an	   experiment	   on	   economic	   decision-­‐making.	   	   You	   will	   be	   paid	   in	   cash	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
experiment	   based	   upon	   your	   decisions	   and	   the	   decisions	   of	   others,	   so	   it	   is	   important	   that	   you	  
understand	  the	  directions	  completely.	   	  All	  payoffs	  are	   in	  cents,	  so	  100	  =	  $1.	   	   If	  you	  have	  a	  question	  at	  
any	   point,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   and	   someone	   will	   come	   to	   you.	   	   Otherwise,	   you	   should	   not	  
communicate	  with	  anyone	  else	  during	  the	  experiment.	  
This	  experiment	  is	  broken	  into	  a	  series	  of	  periods.	  	  In	  any	  period	  there	  are	  3	  young,	  3	  old	  and	  4	  inactive	  
people.	  	  In	  the	  next	  period	  the	  young	  become	  old,	  the	  old	  become	  inactive,	  and	  3	  of	  the	  inactive	  people	  
become	  young.	   	  Which	   inactive	  people	  become	  young	   is	  randomly	  determined,	  but	  everyone	  must	  be	  
inactive	  for	  at	  least	  one	  period	  after	  being	  old	  and	  before	  becoming	  young	  again.	  Notice	  that	  there	  are	  
more	  inactive	  people	  than	  young	  people	  so	  some	  people	  will	  be	  inactive	  for	  multiple	  periods.	  
Young	  and	  old	  people	  earn	  money	  by	  holding	  assets	  (shown	  on	  the	  screen	  as	  colored	  balls).	  	  There	  are	  
three	  kinds	  of	  assets.	  	  Red	  assets	  last	  for	  1	  period	  and	  are	  worth	  0	  to	  everyone.	  	  Yellow	  Assets	  last	  for	  1	  
period	  before	  becoming	  Red	  assets.	   	  Green	  assets	   last	  for	  2	  periods,	  before	  becoming	  Yellow	  assets	   in	  
the	  3rd	  period.	  	  Each	  period,	  two	  young	  people	  start	  with	  a	  Green	  asset	  and	  1	  young	  person	  starts	  with	  a	  
Yellow	  Asset.	  	  This	  is	  determined	  randomly.	  	  Notice	  that	  a	  Green	  asset	  lasts	  longer	  than	  its	  initial	  owner	  
can	  use	  it	  because	  people	  earn	  money	  while	  they	  are	  young	  or	  old,	  but	  not	  while	  they	  are	  inactive.	  	  	  	  
In	  the	  experiment	  there	  are	  wealthy	  and	  poor	  people.	  	  Your	  type	  is	  determined	  randomly	  and	  it	  will	  not	  
change	  during	  the	  entire	  experiment.	  	  	  	  
1)	   Wealthy	   people	   earn	   800	   from	   holding	   a	   Yellow	   or	   Green	   asset	   while	   young.	  	  
2)	  Poor	  people	  earn	  200	  from	  holding	  a	  Yellow	  or	  Green	  asset	  while	  young.	  	  	  
Green	  and	  Yellow	  assets	   are	   always	  worth	  500	   to	   an	  old	  person,	   regardless	  of	  whether	   the	  person	   is	  
Wealthy	  or	  Poor.	  	  Young	  people	  never	  have	  Red	  assets	  and	  no	  one	  can	  hold	  more	  than	  one	  asset.	  	  	  
Here	  are	  screen	  images	  for	  	  	  
a	  Young	  Poor	  Person	  with	  a	  Green	  Asset	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  &	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  an	  Old	  Wealthy	  Person	  with	  a	  Yellow	  Asset	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	  
	  
Period	  earnings	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  table	  at	  the	  bottom	  right	  of	  the	  screen	  (earnings	  are	  updated	  after	  the	  
period	  ends).	   	  Green	   rows	   indicate	  active	  periods.	   	   Since	  people	  cycle	   through	  being	  young,	   then	  old,	  
then	  inactive,	  active	  periods	  come	  in	  pairs.	  	  After	  the	  entire	  experiment	  is	  completed,	  one	  pair	  of	  active	  




You	   cannot	   earn	  money	  with	   an	   asset	  when	   you	   are	   inactive;	   nor	   can	   you	   keep	   it	   until	   you	   become	  
young	  again.	   	   If	  you	  are	  old	  and	  have	  a	  Green	  asset,	  you	  can	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”	  or	  you	  can	  “Donate	  My	  
Asset.”	  Donating	  the	  asset	  means	  that	  a	  young	  person	  with	  a	  yellow	  asset	  
this	  period	  can	  use	  your	  asset	  next	  period.	  	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  
old	  person	  donates	  her	  asset,	  she	  earns	  500	  in	  the	  period	  in	  which	  she	  was	  
old.	  The	  donation	  occurs	   in	   the	  next	  period	  when	   the	  old	  person	  becomes	   inactive.	   	  The	  default	   is	   to	  
“Donate	  My	  Asset.”	  If	  you	  want,	  you	  can	  make	  the	  donation	  by	  pressing	  “Confirm	  Choice.”	  	  If	  you	  want	  
to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”	  you	  must	  first	  click	  on	  this	  option	  and	  then	  click	  “Confirm	  Choice”.	  	  	  	  
If	   (and	   only	   if)	   an	   old	   person	   chooses	   “Keep	  My	   Asset”	   she	   has	   the	   opportunity	   to	   guess	   a	   random	  
number	  between	  0	  and	  999,	  inclusive,	  to	  earn	  10,000	  (that	  is	  US$100).	  	  You	  enter	  a	  guess	  by	  typing	  it	  in	  
the	  box	  below	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  After	  each	  period,	  everyone	  in	  the	  experiment	  will	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  
winning	  number.	  	  	  
A	  young	  person	  with	  a	  yellow	  asset	  has	  to	  choose	  between	  “Accept	  New	  Asset”	  (the	  default	  option)	  or	  
“Keep	  My	  Asset.”	   	  Accepting	  an	  asset	  means	  that	   if	  an	  old	  person	  donates	  
an	   asset	   then	   the	   young	   person	   could	   use	   it	   to	   earn	   money	   in	   the	   next	  
period	  after	  becoming	  old.	   	  A	  young	  person	  who	  instead	  opts	  to	  “Keep	  my	  
Asset”	  will	  be	  able	  to	  guess	  a	  number	  between	  0	  and	  999,	  inclusive,	  to	  win	  
10,000.	  	  Either	  choice	  must	  be	  confirmed	  by	  pressing	  the	  “Confirm	  Choice”	  button.	  	  
A	  young	  person	  with	  a	  green	  asset	  will	  not	  make	  a	  decision	  (as	  he	  automatically	  keeps	  his	  asset),	  nor	  will	  
an	  old	  person	  with	  a	  yellow	  or	  red	  asset	  (as	  this	  asset	  has	  no	  value	  in	  the	  next	  period).	  	  Inactive	  people	  
also	  have	  no	  decision	  to	  make.	  	  	  
In	  the	  following	  examples	  (poor)	  Person	  A	  is	  old	  in	  period	  6	  and	  (wealthy)	  Person	  B	  is	  young	  in	  period	  6.	  	  	  
Example	  1:	  	  	  In	  Period	  6,	  Person	  A	  chooses	  to	  
“Donate	  My	  Asset”	  and	  Person	  B	  chooses	  to	  
“Accept	  New	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  Person	  A	  donates	  the	  asset	  to	  Person	  B.	  	  
No	  one	  has	  the	  chance	  to	  earn	  10,000.	  
Period	  	   	  A	  is	  Poor	   B	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  0	  
6	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  	  	  800	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  
	  
Example	  2:	  	  	  In	  Period	  6,	  Person	  A	  chooses	  to	  
“Donate	  My	  Asset”	  and	  Person	  B	  chooses	  to	  
“Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  Person	  B	  does	  not	  receive	  the	  asset	  and	  	  
only	  Person	  B	  has	  a	  chance	  to	  earn	  10,000.	  
Period	  	   	  A	  is	  Poor	   B	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  
6	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  800	  +	  
	  	  	  	  chance	  at	  	  	  10,000	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  
Once	  you	  have	  completed	  the	  directions	  and	  all	  of	  your	  questions	  are	  answered,	  please	  press	  the	  “Enter	  
ID”	  button	  and	  enter	  your	  experiment	  ID.	  	  After	  you	  have	  done	  this,	  you	  will	  be	  given	  a	  brief	  quiz,	  which	  
will	  not	  affect	  your	  payoff	  in	  any	  way.	  The	  quiz	  is	  intended	  to	  make	  sure	  everyone	  understands	  how	  the	  
experiment	   works	   and	   how	   payoffs	   are	   determined.	   	   The	   experiment	   will	   begin	   after	   everyone	   has	  





The	  next	  set	  of	  periods	  is	  similar	  to	  those	  you	  have	  already	  completed.	  	  The	  only	  difference	  is	  that	  there	  
is	  no	  longer	  an	  opportunity	  to	  guess	  a	  number	  and	  earn	  10,000	  if	  you	  choose	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	  
In	  the	  following	  examples	  (poor)	  Person	  A	  is	  old	  in	  period	  6	  and	  (wealthy)	  Person	  B	  is	  young	  in	  period	  6.	  	  	  
Example	  1:	  	  	  In	  Period	  6,	  Person	  A	  chooses	  	  
to	  “Donate	  My	  Asset”	  and	  Person	  B	  	  
chooses	  to	  “Accept	  New	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  Person	  B	  receives	  the	  asset	  donated	  by	  
Person	  A.	  	  
Period	  	   	  A	  is	  Poor	   B	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  0	  
6	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  	  	  800	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  
	  
Example	  2:	  	  	  In	  Period	  6,	  Person	  A	  chooses	  	  
to	  “Donate	  My	  Asset”	  and	  Person	  B	  	  
chooses	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  Person	  B	  does	  not	  receive	  the	  asset.	  
Period	  	   	  A	  is	  Poor	   B	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  
6	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  	  	  	  	  	  800	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  
Once	   you	  have	   completed	   the	  directions	   and	  all	   of	   your	  questions	   are	   answered,	  please	  wait	   quietly.	  	  
The	  experiment	  will	  resume	  once	  everyone	  has	  completed	  these	  directions.	  	  Keep	  in	  mind	  that	  one	  pair	  
of	  active	  periods	  from	  the	  entire	  experiment	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  to	  determine	  your	  payoff.	  	  
Market	  Treatment	  
The	   next	   set	   of	   periods	   is	   similar	   to	   those	   you	   have	   already	   completed.	   	   The	   only	   difference	   is	   that	  
instead	  of	  assets	  being	  donated,	  you	  may	  now	  buy	  and	  sell	  assets.	  	  An	  old	  person	  with	  a	  green	  asset	  can	  
now	  choose	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”	  or	  “Sell	  My	  Asset.”	   	  Similarly,	  a	  young	  person	  with	  a	  yellow	  asset	  can	  
choose	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”	  or	  “Buy	  An	  Asset.”	   	  Anyone	  who	  chooses	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”	  will	  still	  have	  a	  
chance	  to	  earn	  10,000	  by	  guessing	  a	  number	  from	  0	  to	  999,	  inclusive.	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	  
Old	  people	  with	  a	  green	  asset	  can	  make	  an	  offer	  to	  sell	  by	  typing	  it	  into	  the	  box	  below	  “Sell	  My	  Asset.”	  
Young	   people	  with	   a	   yellow	   asset	   can	  make	   an	   offer	   to	   buy	   by	   typing	   it	   into	   the	   box	   below	   “Buy	  An	  
Asset.”	   Offers	   to	   buy	   and	   sell	  must	   be	   integer	   amounts	   between	   0	   and	   500	   (the	   value	   to	   the	   young	  
person	   of	   the	   asset	   when	   he	   becomes	   old).	   	   You	   must	   press	   “Confirm	   Choice”	   after	   making	   your	  
decision.	  	  One	  of	  several	  things	  will	  happen	  in	  the	  market.	  	  
1.	  	  If	  no	  one	  selects	  “Sell	  My	  Asset”	  or	  no	  one	  selects	  “Buy	  An	  Asset”	  then	  there	  will	  be	  no	  trade	  and	  no	  
price	  in	  the	  market.	  	  	  
	  





3.	   	   If	  the	  offer	  to	  buy	   is	  greater	  than	  only	  one	  of	  the	  offers	  to	  sell	  then	  the	  price	   is	  the	  average	  of	  the	  
offer	   to	  buy	  and	   the	   lowest	  offer	   to	   sell.	   	   The	  young	  buyer	  pays	   the	  price	   to	   the	  old	  person	  with	   the	  
lowest	  offer	  to	  sell	  in	  exchange	  for	  use	  of	  the	  asset	  in	  the	  next	  period.	  	  	  
	  
4.	  If	  the	  offer	  to	  buy	  is	  greater	  than	  both	  offers	  to	  sell	  then	  the	  price	  is	  the	  average	  of	  the	  two	  offers	  to	  
sell.	  	  The	  young	  buyer	  pays	  this	  price	  to	  the	  old	  person	  who	  made	  the	  lowest	  offer	  in	  exchange	  for	  use	  of	  
the	  asset	  in	  the	  next	  period.	  	  	  	  
	  
After	  each	  period,	  everyone	  in	  the	  experiment	  will	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  market	  price,	  if	  it	  exists,	  as	  well	  as	  
all	  offers	  to	  buy	  or	  sell.	  However,	  no	  one	  will	  know	  who	  made	  which	  offer.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  following	  are	  three	  examples	  of	  what	  could	  occur.	  In	  the	  examples	  (poor)	  Person	  A	  is	  old	  in	  period	  6,	  
(wealthy)	  Person	  B	  is	  young	  in	  period	  6,	  and	  (wealthy)	  Person	  C	  is	  old	  in	  period	  6.	  	  
Example	   1:	   	   	   In	   Period	   6,	   Person	  A	   chooses	   to	   “Sell	  My	  Asset”	  with	   an	   offer	   to	   sell	   of	   300,	   Person	   B	  
chooses	  to	  “Buy	  An	  Asset”	  with	  an	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  400,	  and	  Person	  C	  chooses	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  we	  have	  the	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  400	  >	  the	  offer	  to	  sell	  of	  300	  so	  the	  price	  is	  350	  	  
(the	  average	  of	  400	  and	  300)	  and	  Person	  B	  buys	  the	  asset	  from	  Person	  A.	  	  Only	  	  
Person	  C	  has	  the	  chance	  to	  earn	  10,000	  since	  C	  chose	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  
Period	  	   	  A	  (Seller)	  is	  Poor	   B	  (Buyer)	  is	  Wealthy	   C	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   Young	  	  	  800	  
6	   Old	  +	  Price	  
500	  +	  350	  =	  850	  
	  	  	  	  	  Young	  -­‐	  Price	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  800	  -­‐	  350	  =	  450	  
Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  
	  +	  chance	  at	  10,000	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	  
	  
Example	   2:	   	   	   In	   Period	   6,	   Person	  A	   chooses	   to	   “Sell	  My	  Asset”	  with	   an	   offer	   to	   sell	   of	   300,	   Person	   B	  
chooses	  to	  “Buy	  An	  Asset”	  with	  an	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  200,	  and	  Person	  C	  chooses	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  we	  have	  the	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  200	  <	  the	  offer	  to	  sell	  of	  300	  so	  there	  is	  	  
no	  price	  and	  Person	  B	  does	  not	  buy	  the	  asset	  from	  Person	  A.	  	  Only	  	  
Person	  C	  has	  the	  chance	  to	  earn	  10,000	  because	  C	  chose	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  
Period	  	   	  A	  is	  Poor	   B	  is	  Wealthy	   C	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   Young	  	  	  800	  
6	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  	  	  	  	  	  800	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  
	  	  	  +	  chance	  at	  10,000	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	  
	  
Example	   3:	   	   	   In	   Period	   6,	   Person	  A	   chooses	   to	   “Sell	  My	  Asset”	  with	   an	   offer	   to	   sell	   of	   300,	   Person	   B	  
chooses	  to	  “Buy	  An	  Asset”	  with	  an	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  400,	  and	  Person	  C	  chooses	  to	  “Sell	  My	  Asset”	  with	  an	  




In	  this	  case	  we	  have	  the	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  400	  >	  both	  offers	  to	  sell	  of	  350	  and	  300.	  	  The	  	  
price	  is	  325	  (the	  average	  of	  300	  and	  350)	  and	  Person	  B	  buys	  the	  asset	  from	  Person	  A.	  	  No	  one	  
has	  the	  chance	  to	  earn	  10,000	  because	  no	  one	  chose	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  
Period	  	   	  A	  (seller)	  is	  Poor	   B	  (buyer)	  is	  Wealthy	   C	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   Young	  	  	  800	  
6	   Old	  +	  Price	  
500	  +	  325	  =	  825	  
	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  -­‐	  Price	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  800	  	  -­‐	  325	  =	  475	  
Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	  
	  
Once	   you	  have	   completed	   the	  directions	   and	  all	   of	   your	  questions	   are	   answered,	  please	  wait	   quietly.	  	  
The	  experiment	  will	  resume	  once	  everyone	  has	  completed	  these	  directions.	  	  Keep	  in	  mind	  that	  one	  pair	  




Appendix	  B:	  Quiz	  Questions	  
1.	  A	  green	  asset	  lasts	  for	  how	  many	  periods?	  
a. 1	  Period	  
b. 2	  Periods,	  then	  it	  becomes	  a	  yellow	  asset	  for	  1	  more	  period	  
c. 3	  Periods	  
	  
2.	  How	  much	  does	  an	  active	  agent	  with	  a	  red	  asset	  earn	  in	  a	  period?	  
a.	  	   0	  
b.	  	   200	  
c.	  	   500	  
3.	  How	  many	  periods	  will	  an	  agent	  be	  inactive	  after	  being	  old?	  
a.	  	   1	  
b.	  	   2	  
c.	  	   Unknown,	  but	  at	  least	  1	  
4.	  Agents	  may	  hold	  more	  than	  one	  asset	  at	  a	  time.	  
a.	  	   True	  
b.	  	   False	  





6.	  If	  an	  old	  agent	  with	  a	  green	  asset	  chooses	  to	  “Donate	  My	  Asset”,	  then	  that	  agent	  will	  be	  able	  to	  guess	  




7.	  If	  a	  young	  agent	  with	  a	  yellow	  asset	  chooses	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”,	  that	  agent	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  receive	  









NoCost	  Alternate	  Questions	  




7.	  If	  a	  young	  agent	  with	  a	  yellow	  asset	  chooses	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”,	  that	  agent	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  receive	  




Market	  Alternate	  Questions	  




7.	  If	  an	  old	  agent	  with	  a	  green	  asset	  chooses	  to	  “Sell	  My	  Asset”,	  then	  that	  agent	  will	  be	  able	  to	  guess	  a	  
number	  between	  0	  and	  999	  in	  hopes	  of	  earning	  $100.	  
a. True	  
b. False	  
	  
